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These Briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task Force on 
the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather together, in an 
organized, summary form, the proposals and suggestions which the authorities 
in the Member States, the Union's institutions and specialist commentators 
have put forward on the issues likely to be on the IGC/96 agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
1 The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration. 
Coming shortly: 
5 The common foreign ·and security policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments. 
SUMMARY 
29 May 1995 
BRIEFING NO 4 
DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION 
Differentiated integration is a highly political issue which will shape both the 
development of the current Union of 15 and the enlargement of the Union to 
include new countries from the south and east of Europe. 
Most of the proposals put forward hitherto agree on the need for forms of 
differentiated integration based on those already existing in Community practice 
(for example temporary derogations) or in the Treaty on European Union (for 
example, EMU and the CFSP). 
Attempts to extend the notion and the spheres of application of differentiated 
integration beyond these preexisting forms will be resisted by certain Member 
States and certain institutions whose concern is to 'maintain in full the acquis 
communautaire' (see Article B of the TEU). 
Moreover, the guarantees or conditions attached to putting differentiated 
integration into practice will have to be specified where appropriate. 
The potential institutional and legal consequences of any extensive application 
of differentiated integration (for example, the creation of 'cores' of 
countries) are deemed to be 'major' or 'complex' but until now have not been the 
subject of any detailed proposal or analysis. 
CONFERENCE AGENDA 
The question of differentiated integration is not one of the issues due for 
revision under the provisions of the TEU (Article N(2)). However, the European 
Council meeting in Brussels (December 1993) and Corfu (June 1994) stated that 
consideration would be given to measures deemed necessary to guarantee the 
'effective operation (of the work of the Institutions) in the perspective of 
enlargement'. In this context, the question of 'differentiated integration' is 
likely to arise, encompassing such notions as 'Europe ala carte', 'multi-speed 
Europe', 'variable geometry', 'a hard core', 'greater solidarity', etc. 
SOURCES 
The CDU/CSU document on the question of differentiated integration was followed 
by official statements from the French and British heads of government. The 
Spanish Government subsequently made its position clear in the overall document 
published by the Spanish ··Foreign Ministry·. The Commission President, Mr Santer, 
has expressed his views in public on several occasions. 
The Commission report on the operation of the TEU and the Bourlanges/Martin 
report by the European Parliament also deal with this issue. 
Lastly, it would appear useful at this stage to look at the stance taken by the 
European Movement and at comments on the legal aspects of this question. 
POSITIONS 
[The following are summaries or extracts of the positions of: 
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the Spanish Government 
Mr SANTER, 
the European Movement, 
'Justus Lipsius'] 
[For any further information on this briefing, contact Mr GIRAUD, Lux. 2556] 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Report on the functioning of the TEO (17 May 1995) 
( ... ) 
whereas, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
N(2) (of the TEU), the Union ±s to 'maintain in full the acguis 
communautaire and build on it', in accordance with Article B of the 
TEU ( ... ) 
whereas ( ... ) institutional mechanisms designed for a Europe of six 
members ( ... ) could not simply be transposed to a European Union 
with more than 20 members without a risk of paralysis and dilution 
of the European Union ( ... ) 
whereas it would not be wise to enlarge the Union without making a 
number of fundamental changes to the Union and to the European 
Treaties ( ... ) 
15. In view of the increasing diversity of the EU, further flexible 
arrangements may well be required in the future, but these: 
should not undermine the single institutional framework, the 
'acguis communautaire' or the principles of solidarity and 
economic and social cohesion throughout the European Union; 
should not undermine the principle of equality of all States 
and citizens of the Union before the Treaty; 
should not lead to a 'Europe a la carte'. 
16. The European Parliament as a whole will be responsible for 
exercising control over those Union policies which are pursued by ~ 
limited number of Member States on a temporary basis. 
17. If, at the 1996 Conference, despite broad agreement among a 
majority of Member States and peoples of the European Union, it 
proves impossible to reach a positive conclusion owing to failure 
to reach a unanimous decision, consideration will need to be given 
to proceeding without the minority and, possibly, providing for 
instruments to enable a Member State to leave the EU, subject to 
meeting certain criteria. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Resolution on a multi-speed Europe (28 September 1994) 
The European Parliament 
having regard to the Council's statement on a multi-speed Europe 
and the various points of view expressed on the subject, 
1. reaffirms its vision of a European Union in which all Member States 
concerned with proceeding towards integration have equal rights and 
duties; 
2. reaffirms that it would be inconceivable to exclude a priori Member 
States which are ready and willing to pursue their efforts to 
achieve European integration; 
( ... ) 
4. Calls on the Member States to commit themselves at the future 
Intergovernmental Conference to strengthening and democratizing the 
general institutional structure of the Union; 
( ... ) 
6. Rejects an 'a la carte' Europe in which each Member State is 
entitled to dissociate itself from any Community policy; 
7. Considers that, if a small minority of states attempted to block 
all progress during the 1996 intergovernmental conference, ways 
would have to be found of allowing states which want to pursue 
their efforts to achieve European integration still to do so; 
8. Considers that, in view of the major challenges to stability in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, the Union 
should be able to call on the resources it requires to play its 
role as a stable and unifying force, mindful of the need to be 
effective and to consolidate democracy; 
9. Recognizes that the derogations secured in the Maastricht Treaty by 
certain Member States have given rise to dangerous speculation 
about an 'ala carte' Europe; ( ... ) 
( ... ) 
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COMMISSION 
Reoort on the ooeration of the TEU (10 May 1995) 
Preface 
( ... ) 'At tremendous cost, the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe have confirmed their attachment to the values that are at the very 
basis of the Union. The Union, for its part, has-committed itself to 
accepting these countries. 
Herein lies the second challenge. How are these countries to be welcomed 
into the Union without striking at the foundations of all that has been 
achieved in 40 years of European integration? How, in other words, can we 
ensure that enlargement will not multiply our weaknesses but unite our 
strengths? How can we enhance our capacity to take decisions and to act, 
when our diversity becomes more pronounced? Enlargement must represent a 
new arrangement worked out with our eyes open. We have to be aware of its 
implications for the institutions and policies of the Union. The 
Commission is convinced that there is an answer to these questions. There 
is no compelling reason why an endeavour based on openness and solidarity 
should mean weakness and dilution: enlargement and deepening are perfectly 
compatible'. 
( ... ) 'Further enlargement will not only require the Union to strengthen 
its decision-making capacity, but also force us to look more closely at 
the possibility of different speeds of integration. This concept already 
exists both in the context of economic and monetary union and in the 
system set up under the Schengen Agreement - although the latter 
regrettably remains outside the Community framework. There is nothing 
unusual in allowing some Member States a longer period to adjust to 
certain policies. In the Commission's view, however, this must be done 
within a single institutional framework and must centre on a common 
objective. Those states concerned must play their part by not blocking any 
of their partners who wish to move ahead more quickly. 
Permanent exemptions such as that now applying to social policy, which in 
the last analysis have had the regrettable effect of excluding the Social 
Charter from the Treaty, create a problem as they raise the prospect of an 
•a la carte' Europe, to which the Commission is utterly opposed. Allowing 
each country the freedom to pick and choose the policies it takes part in 
would inevitably lead to a negation of Europe'. 
Conclusion 
( ... )'The agreement on social policy between 14 Member States is a 
dangerous precedent for the operation and cohesion of the Union in that 
all the Member States do not share the same objective'. 
( ... )'The Commission therefore has to express two concerns- first, the 
less-than-convincing experience with intergovernmental cooperation under 
the second and third pillars suggests that there can be no question of 
trying to accommodate further enlargements with the present arrangements 




1. There is a danger that the (enlarged) Union will become a looser 
grouping limited to certain economic aspects and made up of various 
sub-groups. An improved free trade area of this kind would not 
enable European societies to face up to external challenges. 
2. The tensions inherent in a Community stretching from the North Cape 
to Gibraltar require sufficient flexibility and differentiation to 
take account of the differing capacity (and desire) of the various 
countries to move towards integration-
Despite the considerable legal and practical difficulties involved, 
the idea of 'variable geometry' and a 'multi-speed Europe' must be 
institutionalized in the Treaty on European Union. 
It is essential that no country should be able to veto and thereby 
block the efforts of other countries which are more able and 
willing to step up cooperation and move at a faster pace towards 
integration (for example, monetary union and Schengen). 
3. Franco-German cooperation must be at the heart of a 'hard core' of 
five Member States (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) which: 
take part in all joint actions, 
launch new initiatives, 
focus in particular on the new spheres of cooperation added by 
the Maastricht Treaty, 
form a monetary union between themselves which itself will 
form the 'hard core' of the political union. 
4. The 'hard core' group must convince all the other Member States to 
join this core group as soon as they are able and willing. 
5. The formation of the hard core is not an end in itself but a means 
of reconciling contradictory objectives - namely, the deepening and 
widening of the Union. 
6. The countries of Eastern Europe - Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary (and Slovenia) should join the Union around the 
year 2000 1 ; provision will have to be made for very long 
differentiated transition periods which will amount to application 
of the concept of variable geometry2 • 
BALLADUR 
(France) 
'Admission (of the Eastern European countries) to the European Union is 
linked to the four (following) measures: institutional development of the 
Union, strengthening of the hard-core, stepping up of Franco-German relations 
and strengthening of the CFSP; it is dependent on the achievement of and is 
also the ultimate goal of those measures'. 
CDU/CSU September 94 
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1. The more Europe expands, the more diversified it will become, at 
least transitionally. A multi-speed Europe (as is already the case 
for monetary and social affairs in the Maastricht Treaty) must be 
accepted as a transitional stage. 
However, it is necessary to preserve an effective, homogenous 
central core centred around France and Germany. 
2. Europe must be structured around three circles: 
(a) the common system of law circle consisting of all the EU 
countries and possibly extending to include all the countries 
of Europe (with the exception of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus): 
this consists of the single market plus the common policies 
plus the CFSP according to the Maastricht Treaty (whose 
institutions will have to be simplified in 1996 to make them 
more effective, representative and transparent); 
(b) smaller circles involving certain EU Member States, allowing 
for closer and better structured cooperation: a monetary 
circle and a military circle which would have different 
members. 
These circles would be open to all the EU countries, which 
would join them when they were able to do so. 
At institutional level, the monetary circle would operate in 
accordance with the rules set by the Maastricht Treaty and the 
military circle would be based on the rules of the WEU, 
although in both cases these rules would have to be made more 
specific; 
(c) a larger circle with the countries remaining outside the Union 
(for example, the USSR and the Mediterranean area) with which 
the Union must form a diplomatic and security organization and 
sign economic and trade agreements (such as the Stability Pact 
and the Partnership for Peace initiative) 1 





1. Cohesion within a Community consisting of between 12 and 16 
countries requires flexibility. Greater flexibility is the only way 
of building a Union consisting of up to 20 or more states. 
Diversity is not a weakness to be suppressed but a strength to be 
controlled. 
2. The way in which the Union develops must be acceptable to all 
Member States, which can accept that some countries will integrate 
more closely/rapidly in certain areas. 
This is the principle of the economic and monetary union and the 
defence union as accepted by the Maastricht Treaty. 
3. However, no Member State must be excluded from a sector in which it 
is able and willing to take part; there must be no exclusive 'hard 
core' of countries and policies. 
4. The Union encompasses a vast range of common policies and areas of 
close cooperation; conformity is necessary in some areas (for 
example, the single market or the environment) but this cannot be 
an automatic principle1 • 
Speech made in Leiden on 7 September 1994 
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SPAIN 
1. No country must be able to exclude another from the most advanced 
process of European integration; no country must prevent those 
which so wish to make further progress in this process; 
2. The concept of variable geometry exists in the Community system. 
The intention is to enable those which cannot or do not wish to 
proceed to remain outside certain policies (for example, the United 
Kingdom in the case of the Social Protocol, the United Kingdom and 
Denmark in the case of the third phase of EMU, the CFSP 'opt-out', 
etc); 
3. The concept of 'greater solidarity' enables the problem of 
enlargement to be solved by allowing those which so wish to proceed 
more rapidly in certain areas (for example, EMU and CFSP); 
4. The best way of breaking the vicious circle of deepening and 
widening is to resort to the concepts of variable geometry and 
greater solidarity - subject to the following conditions: 
(a) using this concept as an exception to the rule and as a last 
resort; 
(b) the 'hard core' must remain open to all those which wish to join 
and which fulfil the conditions set unanimously by the Member 
States (and not by the members of the hard core alone) ; 
(c) flanking policies (for example, cohesion) will be necessary to 
ensure that an ever-widening gap does not open-up between the hard 
core countries and the others; 
(d) all the acguis communautaire must be maintained and a common core 
encompassing all Community policies must be defined; 
(e) a single institutional framework is needed to ensure that the 
Community does not become divided up into groups of the strong and 
the weak; 
(f) the actual composition of the hard core must guarantee political 
balance and stability in Europe1 • 





1. Pressure for a multi-speed approach grows with every enlargement. 
This approach already exists and has enabled the Union to move 
forward. 
2. However, the aim is neither exclusion nor a Europe 'a la carte'. 
No Member State can be excluded from the vanguard; those which wish 
and are able to accept the additional obligations may not be 
rejected. 
Similarly, the vanguard is not closed; those Member States 'lagging 
behind' must be able to join it as soon as they fulfil the 
necessary conditions. 
Chinese walls must not be built around those in the vanguard group; 
the aim is to move forward and not to exclude. 
3. This approach must in no case serve as a pretext for calling into 
question the acguis communautaire or weakening the Community 
institutions. 
4. Any differentiation must occur within a single framework and around 
a common objective - given that a common objective is being 
pursued, this can be done at different speeds. 
5. An 'a la carte' Europe would lead to the negation of Europe. 
6. 'Opt-outs', if viewed as permanent derogations, would lead to an 'a 
la carte' Europe. The issue must therefore be raised during the 
IGC 1 • 
Speech to the European Parliament on 17 January 1995- Agence Europe Bulletin 
of 28 and 30 January 1995 and 11 May 1995. 
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II EUROPEAN MOVEMENT 1 II 
( ... ) 
'It is inadmissible that achievement of the goals of the European Union 
agreed to by a large majority of the Member States depends on the goodwill 
of one of their partners'. 
'It is essential - as was, moreover, recognized in the conclusions of the 
Copenhagen European Council - that the accession countries should accept the 
acauis communautaire and, in particular, the objectives defined in the 
Treaty on European Union, albeit with transition periods which should not be 
excessively long'. 
'It is inadmissible that the opt-out clauses allowed under the Maastricht 
Treaty or the agreements which followed it should be extended as such opt-
outs can only be justified if they are temporary'. 
'The Member States do not only disagree on the essential objectives of the 
Union - currency, security and defence policy - but also on the fundamental 
aspects of institutional reform with regard to democratic legitimacy, 
transparency and the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Progress 
in this sphere is essential in order to bring Europe closer to its citizens 
and enable it to face the challenges of EU enlargement'. 
'These differentiation formulae may lead to the setting up of specialist 
bodies for particular spheres of responsibility. They may also allow for 
the European core to use existing institutions wherever possible'. 
'However, there is no doubt that the formalization of specific procedures 
for--a group of states - even if these are in the majority - and the use of 
institutions by such a bloc poses considerable problems. The Community 
institutional system is not very flexible. This is particularly true of the 
institutions in which the states are not represented as such'. 
'Differentiation and the various formulae put forward for implementing it 
are certainly a last resort, but pressure must be put on those Member States 
which view the European Union merely as a body of activities amongst which 
each Member State may pick and choose depending on its interests. 
Integration means a shared destiny for the peoples of the Union and gives 
specific form to the (necessary) solidarity between those peoples. These 
requirements are incompatible with notions which limit European integration 
to a vast free trade area with a few common policies'. 
International European Movement -Policy Committee on institutional questions 
(5/95) 
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JUSTUS LIPSIUS 1 
'The near-doubling of the number of Member States and their widely differing 
levels of development will clearly require a reform of the Union's 
structures and procedures with the aim of ensuring that the effectiveness of 
the decision-making process is not jeopardized while at the same time 
allowing certain Member States to proceed towards greater integration 
without being prevented from doing so by the other Member States which are 
unable or unwilling'. 
'The only interesting idea appears to be that known as 'variable geometry' -
despite its limits and the problems it will involve, it will nevertheless be 
necessary' . 
'All Member States are involved together in a number of policies or actions; 
for other policies or specific actions, some Member States are allowed to go 
further or deeper, while other Member States are allowed to refrain, 
partially or wholly, from participating'. 
'A single institutional framework, even if the functioning of a given 
institution will have to be changed because not all Member States will take 
part in a particular policy'. 
'A wide, deep, strong common basis, which should include all policies in the 
conduct of which differences between the Member States could give rise to 
considerable distortion of competition. These would still allow for long 
transition periods for a particular Member State so as to take account of 
its level of economic development'. 
'A minimum level of rules should be compulsory even for 'optional policies'. 
Derogations should never be total and/or absolute. Moreover, the Treaty 
should provide for the possibility of adopting compensatory measures in the 
event of distortion of competition'. 
'One of the main principles should be the rule of 'non-interference' 
particular types of cooperation must not jeopardize common policies and 
those Member States which do not take part in a given action should not be 
able to place obstacles in the way of action decided on by other Member 
States on the basis of the Treaty'. 
'Particular problems would arise in the sphere of foreign policy'. 
'Too many opt-out clauses in the sphere of the foreign common and security 
policy (CFSP) could undermine the European Union's ambitions to play an 
important role on the international stage'. 
'The possibility of cooperation outside the Treatv could be authorized or 
even encouraged by an extension of Article 233 of the EC Treaty, but this 
would be damaging to the unity of the European Union'. 
Quarterly review of European law No. 2/95 
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